The relationship between signal cost and honesty is a controversial and unresolved 18 issue. The handicap principle assumes that signals must be costly at equilibrium to be honest, 19 and the greater the cost, the more reliable the signal. However, theoretical models and 20 simulations question the necessity of equilibrium cost for the evolution of honest signalling. 21
Introduction

36
The evolution of honest signalling remains a controversial problem. The most cited 37 theory is the so-called handicap principle [1] [2] [3] . There are several versions of this hypothesis, 38 which all assume that signals must be costly at the evolutionary equilibrium to be honest, and 39 that the honest signals evolve because rather than despite of their costs. The most-cited 40 version concludes that honest signals of individual quality evolve when low quality 41 individuals pay higher costs for signalling compared to high quality individuals (strategic or 42 differential costs handicap model) [2] . Zahavi argued that honest signals evolve through a 43 special type of selection, called 'signal selection' that mysteriously favours waste rather than 44 efficiency [3] . Yet, there have been an increasing number of theoretical studies that challenge 45 the claim that signals must be costly at equilibrium to be honest [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . 46
The evolution of honest signals has been investigated in several game theoretical 47 models. These signalling games have shown the existence of various solutions from non-48 signalling [11] , through pooling [12] to costly [2, 13, 14] or cheap separating equilibria [4] [5] [6] . 49
Multiple equilibria often coexist in a single model [6, [15] [16] [17] . Unfortunately, standard game 50 theory cannot predict which one of these equilibria will be reached by evolution [17] . An 51 evolutionary approach is needed to resolve this problem, which can make predictions on the 52 trajectory of evolving populations. 53
Individual or agent-based models provide an alternative approach to study such 54 evolutionary trajectories [11, [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] ]. These models have highlighted different aspects of 55 selection for honest signals, such as the evolution (or lack of) of honest and cheating 56 strategies in a game of aggressive communication [18] [19] [20] , the instability of costly equilibria 57 in parent-offspring communication [11] or the role of signal competition in the evolution of 58 costly signals [22] . Recently, Kane & Zollman [21] investigated the different attractors of 59 honest costly versus hybrid equilibria in a differential benefit model of a simple action-60 response game. They found that the hybrid equilibrium evolved more frequently. They also 61 found that low cost of both signals favours the evolution of costly honest equilibria. In other 62 words, costly equilibria evolve but only if it is not too costly [21] . 63
While the above models investigate interesting problems none of them investigates 64 systematically the role of equilibrium on honesty in both differential benefit and differential 65 cost models. Here we this question. Our goal is to determine the relationship between the 66 signal cost paid by honest signallers at the equilibrium and the honesty of the system. We 67 considered two conditions: (i) when there is no correlation between the signal cost for low and 68 high-quality individuals (differential cost model), and (ii) with correlation between the signal 69 cost for low and high-quality individuals (differential benefit and differential cost model). We 70 modelled the evolution of signalling by means of individual based simulations. We found that 71 honesty evolved more readily at intermediate values of equilibrium signal cost when there is a 72 correlation between signal cost paid by low and high-quality individuals, but there is a 73 monotone decreasing relation between honesty and equilibrium signal cost when there is no 74 such correlation. 75 76 2. The model 77 We used a simple signalling game known as an action-response game [4, 5, 14, 23] . This 78 type of signalling game is used to describe situations in which receivers control a (non-79 divisible) resource that signallers wish to obtain, such as during mate assessment or parent-80 offspring conflict [24] . There is a signaller and a receiver; the receiver holds an indivisible 81 resource. Signallers can be either high or low quality, and their quality is not known and 82 cannot be observed by the receivers. Signallers are always better off with the resource, and 83 receivers are only interested in transferring the resource to high quality signallers. The 84 signallers can opt to display a signal, which may or may not be an honest signal of quality. 85
The receivers' fitness (Fr) depends both on the signaller's quality (a), which can be high 86 fitness can be written up as follows: 93
(2) 95
The fitness of both the receiver and the signaller can depend on the survival of the other 96 player (r); in the simplest case this could imply that they are relatives; alternatively, they can 97 help each other in some other way or they can belong to the same group (see Maynard Smith, 98 1991). With the help of r it is both possible to describe situations where this interdependence is 99 high (r>>0, for example parent-offspring communication) or situation where there is no 100 relatedness and the players do not interact with each other outside the signalling game (i.e. r=0). 101
Based on these assumptions the inclusive fitness of the signaller (Es) and the receiver (Er) can 102 be written as follows: 103
Let Vh and Vl denote the difference in fitness for high-, and low-quality signaller 106 respectively between obtaining the resource or not [4, 5]: 107
108 = ( , ) − ( , ).
(6) 109
We can define Wh, Wl and Ch, Cl in a similar way: 110
113 = ( , ) − ( , ).
(10) 114
This notation will be used in the rest of the article (see Table 1 . for a summary). Figure  115 1 depicts the signalling game and Table 2 describes the pay-offs. 116
The last step is to identify the available strategies for receivers and signallers. playing an action-response game. The structure of the game corresponds to the analytical 136 model (see Figure 1 ). Signaller and receiver behaviour coded by "genes" that can be inherited 137 into the next generation. Both signallers and receiver have two genes. The first gene of 138 signallers specifies which signal to give when low quality, the second one specifies which 139 signal to give when high quality. The first gene of receivers specifies which response to give 140 when the signaller did not send a signal, the second specifies which response to give in case 141 of a signal. Each scenario was seeded with a random mix of signaller and receiver strategies. 142
Each individual plays ten games against randomly chosen opponents in one step of the 143 simulations. Reproductive success is proportional to the pay-offs received when playing this 144 action-response game. Individuals produced offspring proportional to their fitness. Out of the 145 pool of offspring one offspring was selected randomly; this offspring replaced a randomly 146 selected individual of the original population. The offspring inherits its genes from its parent 147 with a mutation probability =0.05. Simulations were iterated for i=20000 steps. For each 148 parameter combination m=100 independent runs were implemented. The last step of these 149 runs was taken and analysed in detail. The timeline of each run was also saved and analysed. 150
We manipulated the comparative advantage of high quality signallers in four different 151 scenarios. We changed the benefit difference between high and low-quality signallers in the 152 differential benefit models (dV), or we changed the cost difference between low and high 153 quality signallers in the differential cost scenarios (dC). We changed the cost of signalling for 154 high quality signallers (Ch) from zero to one with steps 0.1. The cost of signal for low quality 155 individuals (Cl) was either the same in differential benefit models, or it was the cost of signal 156 for high quality individuals plus the cost difference in the scenario (dC). These scenarios and 157 the corresponding parameters are summed up in Table 3 and 4. 158
We measured several properties of the system including honesty, trust and the 159 potential cost of cheating. This potential cost can be defined as the cost for low quality 160 individuals to mimic the intensity of signals used by high quality individuals: 161
Honesty (H) measures the correlation between signal and the underlying quality 163
[8] (Számadó, 2011) , and thus it can vary between -1 and 1. Trust can vary between 0 and 1 164 and it measures how willing are receivers to give the resource to signallers who give signals 165 higher than the lowest signal intensity. 166 167
Results
168
There is a clear optimal investment for equilibrium signal cost in both differential benefit 169 and differential cost models with correlated signal cost. Differential cost models perform 170 better and achieve higher levels of honesty than differential benefit ones (see Figure 2 ). Figure  171 3 shows a more detailed breakdown of these results. It is clear that there is an optimum value 172 of signal cost for high quality signallers in differential benefit models regardless of the region 173 (hybrid vs. honest; see Fig 3.a vs 3.c) . On the other hand, differential cost models have clear 174 optimum only in the hybrid region (Fig 3.b) ; increasing the equilibrium cost of signalling has 175 no effect on honesty in the honest region up to a threshold (the cost for high quality 176 individuals, Ch=0.5; see Fig 3.d) . After this threshold, honesty declines rapidly with 177 increasing signal cost for high quality signallers. 178
Increasing the signal cost for high quality signallers is clearly an obstacle for the evolution 179 of honesty in the hybrid region in the case of uncorrelated cost (Fig 4. ). Honesty seems to be 180 robust against the increase of costs for high quality signallers (Ch) in the honest region up to 181 some point, just like before (Fig 3.d) , and afterwards honesty rapidly declines with increasing 182
Ch. All in all, there is no region in the uncorrelated cost model where increasing signal cost 183 for honest signallers would promote the evolution of honest signalling. 184
We have also made "heat maps" to show the trajectories of individual runs in the trust-185 honesty state-space. Populations show random walk like behaviour at low potential cost of 186 cheating (Fig 5,6) , whereas populations quickly converge into the high trust -high honesty 187 region with high potential cost of cheating (Fig 7,8) . Here we studied the co-evolution of signal cost and honesty in a simple action-response 192 signalling game using individual based computer simulations. Our results show that 193 increasing the equilibrium cost for honest (high quality) signallers promotes the evolution of 194 honesty only as long as (i) it contributes to the increase of the potential cost of cheating, and 195 (ii) it is not close or higher than the potential benefits of signalling for high quality signallers. 196
These results indicate that there is clear optimum for equilibrium cost both in differential 197 benefit and differential cost models -though only as long as the signal costs of low and high-198 quality individuals are correlated. If there is no such correlation between these costs, then the 199 increase of equilibrium cost is detrimental to the evolution of honest signalling. Last but not 200 least, the potential cost of cheating is a much better predictor of the evolution of honesty than 201 the equilibrium cost of signals. All in all, increasing the equilibrium cost of signals only promotes the evolution of 209 honesty as long as it contributes to the potential cost of cheating (in differential benefit and in 210 correlated cost models); however, even in these scenarios there is an optimum value of 211 equilibrium cost. The realized cost paid by honest signallers actually hinders the evolution of 212 honest signalling when it is uncorrelated with the potential cost of cheating. 213
These results have important implications for Zahavi's handicap principle [3] . The 214 predictions of Zahavi can be broadly classified into equilibrium predictions and predictions 215 about the expected evolutionary trajectory of signal evolution. The equilibrium prediction is 216 that selection favours honest signals and that honesty is maintained by a wasteful signal cost. 217
The evolutionary prediction is that receivers should prefer costly signals, as the costs provide 218 a guarantee for honesty. The current results along with previous investigations (see [8] for a 219 review) show that none of the main predictions of the handicap principle are supported. 220
Signals need not be costly to be honest and costlier signals are not necessarily more honest. 221
Therefore, the claim that honest signals evolve because they are costly is incorrect. Signals 222 evolve just like any other trait in biology. Efficacy of a functional trait can improve with 223 additional investment, but only up to a point (assuming that it contributes to the potential cost 224 of cheating); after that point, further investment (i.e., waste) is detrimental. To understand 225 whether equilibrium cost plays a role in promoting honesty one has to understand the 226 relationship between equilibrium cost and the potential cost of cheating. The lack of 227 correlation between the two implies that increasing the equilibrium cost of signals will be 228 detrimental to the evolution of honest signalling. Ch. Red: differential benefit models; blue: differential cost models. 306 advantage (dV ranging from 0,3-0,9; hybrid region); (b) differential cost models with different 309 comparative advantage (dC ranging from 0,3-0,9; hybrid region); (c) differential benefit models 310 with different comparative advantage (dV ranging from 1,1-1,7; honest region); (d) differential 311 cost models with different comparative advantage (dC ranging from 1,1-1,7; honest region). 312
Small inlet shows the change of cost for low quality individuals (Cl) as function of Ch in each 313 of these scenarios. 314 to red: from early steps to last steps. Differential benefit model, parameters: dV=0.5, C=0.6. 324 Table 3 . Correlated cost. 335 differential benefit models differential cost models 
